好学IT学院:IT信息技术分享交流平台
来源:网络大典  作者:佚名  发布时间:2008-12-27  ★★★加入收藏〗〖手机版
摘要:(ComputerOperatingSystemTechnicalFeatureComparison)…

Primary APIs Resource access control Subsystem isolation mechanisms Integrated firewall Encrypted file systems
SysV, POSIX Unix, ACLs chroot IP Filter, IPSec VPNs, basic IDS No
Proprietary, POSIX environment functions available thru GNU licensed Amiga ixemul.library     No No
BSD, POSIX Unix, ACLs, MAC chroot, jail, MAC Partitions IPFW2, IPFilter, PF Yes
SysV, POSIX Unix, ACLs chroot IPFilter No
POSIX Unix, ACLs, MAC chroot, Capability-based security11, seccomp, SELinux, IPSec Netfilter/Varied by distribution Yes
proprietary Unix Namespaces    
proprietary, Carbon none none none No
Carbon, Cocoa, BSD/POSIX, X11 (since 10.3) Unix, ACLs chroot ipfw Yes
BSD, POSIX Unix, Veriexec chroot, systrace IPFilter, PF Yes
proprietary Directory-enabled ACLs Protected Address Spaces IPFLT.NLM Yes
proprietary Directory-enabled ACLs chroot IPFilter Yes
BSD, POSIX Unix chroot, systrace PF Yes
proprietary, Unix-like ACLs, Privileges logical name tables    
proprietary ACLs none none No
BSD, POSIX Unix, ACLs, MAC chroot, jail, MAC Partitions IPFW2, IPFilter, PF Yes
Unix-like (and optional POSIX compatibility layer) Unix Namespaces ipmux Yes
Windows API        
Huge number of SWI calls; extensive C libraries        
SysV, POSIX Unix, RBAC, ACLs, Privileges, Trusted Extension chroot, Containers IPFilter Yes
some SysV, some POSIX, some Linux, some proprietary Unix, Multilevel security, Biba mandatory integrity, ACLs, Privileges, subtype mechanism Multilevel security, Biba Integrity Model, subtype mechanism customer would have to install their own application No
Windows API, .NET ACLs, Privileges, RBAC Win32 WindowStation, Desktop, Job objects Windows Firewall,IPSec TCP\IP Filtering Yes
Windows API, .NET ACLs Win32 WindowStation, Desktop, Job objects Windows Firewall (XP and later), TCP\IP Filtering (NT Based systems), IPSec Yes (NTFS Only)
POSIX, BeOS API Unix none none No

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